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As Poland has careened away from the rule of law, the European Commission has struggled to work out its
response. The new “complementary Recommendation” issued on 21 December 2016 gives the Polish
government more time to address the Commission’s growing set of serious concerns, but it is already clear that
the Polish government is using its extra time to further consolidate its constitutional capture.
In fact, the Commission issued its new Recommendation on the very day that Andrzej Rzepliński, the
Constitutional Tribunal’s brave President, stepped down at the end of his term, setting in motion the endgame for
the ultimate capitulation of the Constitutional Tribunal that was forecast months ago by, among others,
Maximilian Steinbeis, the editor of the Verfassungblog. The Commission’s Recommendation clearly
acknowledged that the Tribunal was about to be lost, but still, it failed to do anything that might have given the
government pause in its relentless drive to abolish the Tribunal’s independence. The Commission’s new
Recommendation was therefore dead on arrival, since the events it tried to forestall had already come to pass.
The Commission’s delay and continued reluctance to start the sanctions process will make it harder for any
external pressure to undo the damage.
In this post, we consider why the Commission hesitated to respond, and what this means for the future of the
EU. Part of this story is that Article 7 TEU, which lays out a warning and sanctions process for Member States
that violate basic EU values, is diﬃcult to successfully invoke, as it sets up supermajority hurdles at both the
European Council and the European Parliament before sanctions may be adopted. But there are other reasons
too. Given Europe’s multiple crises at the moment, the internal aﬀairs of a rogue government or two may seem
less critical to Europe’s well being than crises that aﬀect multiple states at the same time, like the refugee crisis,
the Euro-crisis or the fallout from Brexit. But the proliferation of governments inside the EU that no longer share
basic European values undermines the reason for existence of the EU in the ﬁrst place and threatens the
functioning of a legal framework which ‘is based on the fundamental premiss that each Member State shares
with all the other Member States, and recognises that they share with it, a set of common values on which the
EU is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU’ (Opinion 2/13, para. 168).
The “values crisis” may not seem as urgent as the other crises on European plates, but it has the most far-
reaching implications for the European project because without common values, there are fewer reasons for the
EU to exist. Europe therefore fails to act at its peril. And it needs to act before rogue governments become ever
more entrenched.
1. The Abdication of EU Institutions in the Polish Case
While the criticism in Part I of this post has been directed at the Commission for its failure to address the Polish
problem more forcefully by triggering Article 7 TEU before the capture of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal was
completed, the Commission’s continuing failure to defend the rule of law is due in no small part to the European
Council’s shameful lack of action. The European Council has done nothing about either Hungary or Poland over
the seven years that constitutionalism has been under attack ﬁrst in one and now in both. On the eve of a
confrontation in Poland between governing party MPs and opposition protestors in December 2016, European
Council President Donald Tusk, himself a Pole, broke his silence for the ﬁrst time, suggesting gently that all
sides might behave themselves, and honour the constitution. But the European Council did not act as an
institution.
This abdication of the European Council as the EU’s sixth largest economy abandons the rule of law reveals yet
another weakness in the European project: A country that could meet the entry criteria to join the EU was
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presumed to retain its constitutional-democratic commitments over the long haul so the EU gave itself few
options to correct problems if a country’s commitments began to falter. If the EU is not a community of values,
however, it is only an economic shell. Amnesty International was therefore right to call for European
governments to ‘step up to the plate and support the people of Poland by placing this serious threat to rule of law
and human rights on the agenda of the Council’ (see press release issued on 21 December 2016).
Given the European Council’s lethargy on ﬁrst Hungary and now Poland, one wonders where the countries are
which just a few years ago asked the Commission to introduce a ‘new, light mechanism’ to enable it to make
recommendations or report back to the Council ‘in the case of concrete evidence of violations’ of the EU’s
fundamental values or principles such as the rule of law. Ironically, Poland was one of the eleven signatories of
the so-called Westerwelle report. The Polish Prime Minister was then Donald Tusk, who is now President of the
European Council and one of the European leaders who has most conspicuously failed to act to arrest the
deterioration of the rule of law in Poland, speaking out only once after more than a year of assaults on
constitutional institutions. Perhaps this is because his home government has threatened not to back him for
renewal in the post and has even held out the possibility of bringing criminal charges against him on the basis of
an investigation that most observers outside the country believe is politically motivated. And yet no EU oﬃcial
has forcefully spoken out against these attempts by a Member State to bully its nationals serving in EU oﬃces
when that bullying itself is connected to the assault on the rule of law.
The Council has been similarly lethargic and its inaction is furthermore accompanied by inconsistent public
pronouncements. In the Joint Declaration on the EU’s Legislative Priorities for 2017 it recently co-signed, a
number of important issues are identiﬁed as goals, including the pursuit of ‘our commitment to common
European values, the rule of law and fundamental rights, including our joint engagement to stand up against
discrimination and xenophobia’. One may also note in passing that Robert Fico signed this joint declaration on
behalf of the Council as Slovakia was then holding the rotating Council Presidency. This is the same politician
who said in 2016 that ‘Islam has no place in Slovakia’ and was included in Politico’s 2015 ‘ top 10 wackiest anti-
refugee remarks’, alongside Marine Le Pen, Jaroslaw Kaczyński, Viktor Orbán to name but a few. In short,
values backsliding, rhetorically speaking, is not conﬁned to Hungary and Poland.
Notwithstanding the gap between rhetoric and action, this continuing lack of support from the European Council
and the Council, both representing the Member States within the EU, at least renders the Commission’s
reluctance to activate the misnamed ‘nuclear option’ understandable (see our previous analysis of President
Juncker’s comments on Article 7). There may be indeed a cost to be paid if the Commission triggers Article 7
and none of the other key EU institutions take any note of it. To wait however for a clear signal from a majority of
national governments that Article 7 would succeed seems, however, like an excuse for not doing anything.
Indeed, why would any national government signal its intent to support the Commission when there is no
certainty the Commission may trigger Article 7? Such a public stand would require paying a diplomatic price for a
position which may ultimately be proven unnecessary.
Because the Commission, rightly or wrongly, expects political backing before moving to the next logical step, this
leaves it no other option than working with the Parliament. Strictly speaking, the Parliament could activate Article
7 itself, though there are supermajority hurdles there also: for the purposes of Article 7, the Parliament is
required to “act by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing the majority of its component Members”
(see Article 354 TFEU). But considering the Commission’s acquired expertise in the situation in Poland and the
complications of party politics in the Parliament, it would indeed make sense for the Commission to take the lead
and activate Article 7.
Having two of the three major institutions behind a condemnation of Poland is better than one, even if not
enough to actually issue any sanctions. Article 7 requires Council supermajorities to determine that there is a
“clear risk of a serious breach” of EU values such as the rule of law in a Member State while requiring unanimity
in the European Council members save the oﬀending state when it comes to determining the existence of a
“serious and persistent breach”. One may only hope that an eventual collaboration between the Parliament and
the Commission might further shame the Council or the European Council into acting. But the high hurdles
previously noted do not make the Article 7 sanctioning process easy.
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That said, the Parliament has actually been quite active in both Hungary and Poland, while leaving the actual
triggering of Article 7 to the other EU institutions. Parliament took the lead in the case of Hungary, when the
Tavares Report of July 2013 passed the European Parliament on an overwhelming vote and called upon the
Commission to begin monitoring Hungary with the goal of eventually triggering Article 7 if Hungary did not
change its ways. Following the Report, however, neither the Commission nor the Council took up the
responsibilities that the Parliament had urged on them, and nothing serious was done about Hungary’s
backsliding. Though this inaction from the other institutions could have discouraged the Parliament from
continuing, the Parliament tried again in December 2015 when it directly called upon the European Commission
“to activate the ﬁrst stage of the EU framework to strengthen the rule of law” in order to evaluate “the emergence
of a systemic threat in that Member State which could develop into a clear risk of a serious breach within the
meaning of Article 7 TEU”. But here, too, the Commission failed to act. And while the Commission on 30
November 2015 did accept to register a European Citizens’ Initiative requesting the activation of Article 7 against
Hungary, it was subsequently closed by its initiators. None of these prods from the more democratic institutions
of the EU have gotten the Commission to budge.
With regard to Poland, the Parliament has similarly expressed its concerns with a resolution in September over
the situation identiﬁed by the Commission in its rule of law dialogue with the country. The resolution expressed
support for the actions of the Commission and expressed the Parliament’s concern about the fact that the Polish
government seemed unwilling “to cooperate with the Commission pursuant to the principle of sincere
cooperation” in order to solve “the ongoing constitutional crisis” in Poland. But the Parliament did not even
mention Article 7. It instead clearly indicated that the ball was in the Commission’s court.
The problem is that while EU institutions get their act together, the capture of the Constitutional Tribunal by PiS-
compatible judges means that it is just a matter of time before the PiS majority on the Tribunal is able to directly
or indirectly overrule the judgements referred to by the Commission in its recommendations, while ignoring the
most blatant violations of the Polish Constitution whenever it is required to facilitate the implementation of
Kaczyński’s illiberal agenda. Indeed, Julia Przyłębska’s appointment as the new president of the Tribunal on the
day the recommendation was issued ignored the strongly expressed views of the Commission that the
appointment of a new president be deferred. In light of her previous record, one might reasonably expect that the
Tribunal has been for all intents and purposes been eﬀectively neutralised already (for further analysis, see Prof
Koncewicz, Living under the unconstitutional capture and hoping for the constitutional recapture).
As evidence, the new President of the Tribunal has already made a decision to seat the unconstitutionally
elected PiS judges and is now in a position to take up (or not) particular matters before the court, stall the
controversial cases to the point where they become moot, and rule in the government’s favour whenever judicial
support is required. To maintain the ﬁction that the Constitutional Tribunal is functioning, we see that the Polish
authorities have already started to refer controversial measures to the Tribunal when they would ﬁnd a judicial
rubber stamp useful. Last week’s decision of Polish President Duda to send the controversial freedom of
assembly bill to the Constitutional Tribunal (Reuters, 29 Dec. 2016), just a few days after the Tribunal was
captured, shows that the government now trusts that the Tribunal will not disrupt their plans to consolidate
autocracy in Poland. Rather the reverse.
Once again, Hungary provides the model. As happened with the Constitutional Court in Budapest, the now-
captured Constitutional Tribunal in Warsaw can be expected to approve whatever the government puts before it.
The government can then use the court’s positive decisions to defend itself from external criticism. It is indeed
easy to imagine Polish Prime Minister Szydło saying to Commission First Vice President Timmermans:  “Last
week, you said you were defending our Constitutional Tribunal and this week you reject its decisions.” As in
Hungary, one might expect that the Tribunal may hold some minor measures incompatible with the Polish
Constitution from time to time if only to preserve appearances and convince uncritical outsiders that the system
is still formally compliant with the rule of law.
In a study worth reading, Prof Bátory shows that countries deﬁcient in the rule of law like Hungary often engage
in creative and symbolic compliance strategies to enable the Commission to disengage from conﬂicts it judges
too costly while still maintaining its credibility. The ploy works even when compliance with EU values is not
achieved on the ground. The experience of Hungary shows that even if Article 7 were to be triggered by the
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Commission in the spring with regard to Poland, the Council would then be in a position to pretend that the
previously denounced systemic threat to the rule of law had already been ﬁxed because the Constitutional
Tribunal would be operating and the government will be complying with its new decisions. By that time, the
various reports and recommendations that the European Commission and Venice Commission have produced
will seem to be out of date, leading credence to a Polish governmental claim that it has taken note of the
Commission’s various recommendations and everything is now ﬁne.
Given the time it takes to mobilize the action of European institutions, fast-moving situations can always escape
being policed because the EU is not nimble enough to act at the same pace. We have already seen European
institutions try and fail to discipline Hungary when the Orbán government moved to swiftly bring all formerly
independent institutions under party control. Orbán always claimed to have solved all of the problems identiﬁed
by the European Commission just before the sanctions bit. European institutions now repeat the same dance
with a diﬀerent partner who follows the same steps. If the Polish government looks to Hungary as a positive
model, then European institutions should look to Hungary as a negative one. The EU might reasonably suspect
that it will have the same ineﬀective results by following with regard to Poland the same set of threats followed by
inaction as it did in Hungary.
2. What else can be done?
2.1 Learning from past mistakes: What EU institutions did not learn from Hungary
The key ﬁnding one may draw from the Commission’s ongoing struggle with Poland is that it has not learned the
right lessons from its past dealings with Hungary. When Orbán’s Fidesz party came to power in 2010 and started
its methodical capture of state institutions and the media, the Commission wrongly assumed they were just
dealing with a national government intent on implementing a nationalist agenda and sought to rely on the
traditional infringement procedure to ﬁght the most visible violations of speciﬁc provisions of EU Law.
This strategy utterly failed. It failed ﬁrst because not only the Commission but also all other EU institutions did not
grasp that they were dealing with a new type of meticulous and legalistic autocrat following a clearly designed
blueprint that aimed to progressively dismantle national checks and balances in order to establish a majoritarian
one-party autocracy which would never have to fear subsequent elections.
The European Parliament correctly diagnosed the problem in July 2013 and urged the Commission ‘to focus not
only on speciﬁc infringements of EU law, to be remedied notably through Article 258 TFEU, but to respond
appropriately to a systemic change in the constitutional and legal system and practice of a Member State where
multiple and recurrent infringements unfortunately result in a state of legal uncertainty, which no longer meets
the requirements of Article 2 TEU.’ Had the Commission taken this diagnosis fully on board, it may have been
convinced to look beyond individual breaches of EU law and consider instead ‘the combined impact of a number
of measures exacerbating the state of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights’ as requested (again)
by the European Parliament in June 2015.
In the Commission’s defence, Orbán’s strategy for dismantling the ‘liberal state’ was not easy to decipher, at
least initially, as this was indeed an unprecedented phenomenon in the EU. The Commission might also have
been hampered because the European’s People Party was doing its best to shield Orbán from criticism in the
name of partisan politics (see Prof Kelemen, “EPP ♥ Orbán” in Politico.eu), even though at least half of the EPP
members split from the party’s oﬃcial position and refused to block the Tavares Report in July 2013.
Perhaps even more signiﬁcant was the fact that the Commission received no support from either the European
Council or the Council for more drastic actions or sanctions in the Hungarian case. To give a single example:
rather than supporting unambiguously the Commission’s rule of law Framework, national governments acting
within the framework of the European Council decided instead to establish their very own “annual rule of law
dialogue”, which is tragically ineﬀective because it asks Member States to report on themselves, and this tends
to produce more self-congratulation than criticism. The Council’s new rule of law dialogue followed on the
adoption of a poorly argued opinion by the Council Legal Service in which implausibly denied the Commission’s
authority to adopt its Rule of Law Framework (for a critique of the Council Legal Service’s opinion, which has
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since been referred to by the Polish government to argue that the Commission is acting ultra vires, see Profs
Baratta; Bogdandy et al; Besselink; Hillion; Kochenov & Pech).
Notwithstanding the lack of reliable support from the Council, the Commission’s strategy also failed because
Orbán had learn to implement a fait accompli strategy, which included tactical retreats and the adoption of the
most minimalistic formal remedies when found in breach of EU law, leaving values-violating practices in place.
For example, when the Court of Justice ruled against Hungary for ﬁring its data protection commissioner,
Hungary successfully argued that it should not ﬁre the new more politically compliant one whose “independence”
should be protected but should simply pay compensation to the ﬁred one. The same thing happened with the
judges who were the victims of a newly announced lower judicial retirement age. In other words, what PiS has
learned from Orbán is that EU will never ask for a sitting oﬃcial to be removed even when illegally appointed.
This is why Polish authorities have ignored the Commission’s recommendations until it was in a position to put
its unconstitutional judges in place. Now, the EU will ﬁnd virtually impossible to dislodge the unconstitutionally
selected judges in order for constitutionality to be restored. If the Polish case is like the Hungarian one, the
Commission may even be satisﬁed with a solution that gives even more protection against removal to the foxes
that have been let into the henhouse as a way of dealing with the fact that the previous roosters were
manhandled. In Hungary, the new judges appointed in place of the prematurely retired ones were given
additional guarantees that they could now not be removed as part of the Commission’s settlement of that case.
Another particularly disheartening feature of the current situation is that some in the Commission still seem in
denial about how illiberal forces capture democratic regimes. The Commission’s reaction to the Hungarian
constitutional capture revealed a persistent failure or unwillingness to look at the cumulative and interconnected
eﬀects of the continuing attacks on the rule of law. This was made clear in a recent interview of Timmermans
published in Handelsblatt. To the question “Why don’t you do anything against the authoritarianism of Prime
Minister Viktor Orbán?,” Timmermans oﬀered the following answer: “Because it’s not so easy. The Hungarian
government is acting quite cleverly – like a driver who exceeds the speed limit but puts on the brakes just before
there is trouble.” This is not inaccurate but as noted by FIDH in a must-read report on “Hungary: Democracy
under Threat” published in November 2016:
While each one of the violations listed in this report may not perhaps in itself constitute suﬃcient
grounds to speak of systematic and irreversible violation of the rule of law, with the authorities
frequently arguing that such and such a measure or law has been borrowed or is similar to those
of other EU Member States, consideration of all these violations taken together, and the mass of
resulting infringements enables us to see that in the system set up by the Hungarian authorities
since 2010, lies a network of grey areas and stumbling blocks that draws an opaque picture
where the principles of the rule of law seem ineﬀective.
This network constitutes a «best of» the worst practices in the ﬁeld. All these violations taken
together demonstrate a concerted action by the State that can only be premeditated, in order to
take control systematically, with determination and to the sole advantage of the supporters of
Fidesz, of the whole State apparatus, with disregard for the necessary separation of powers, with
disregard for the sound organization of democratic checks and balances, including civil society,
with disregard for fundamental rights and the principle of non-discrimination and in ﬂagrant
violation of the principles underpinning the rule of law. (…)
Such systematic and concerted action cannot be merely admonished sporadically on the basis of a speciﬁc
violation of a particular directive or regulation. It is crucial that the EU ﬁnally consider the violations as a whole
and with what they reveal as a concerted attempt against its founding values.
The eﬀective takeover of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal by PiS judges follows the same trajectory. It is not a
single action, taken alone, but followed the party’s consolidation of its grip on the media which, in turn, follows on
its capture of the civil service, prosecutor’s oﬃce and more. This pattern should signal a similarly ambitious
campaign to undermine all independent institutions and to make them dependent on the governing party. If the
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Hungarian precedent is any indication, one can expect PiS to start using these newly captured institutions for
their own partisan-political purposes. And, as in Hungary, the government will not rest until every last bastion of
opposition is smashed.
The capture of the Constitutional Tribunal will now allow the Polish government to adopt unconstitutional
measures without having to fear any adverse consequences on the legal front. Public opinion may be a diﬀerent
matter, but if all can see that the Tribunal will back the government, there is no point for civil society to bring the
cases challenging the new laws. Ironically, the EU does oﬀer one solution for those in the political opposition in
countries whose governments are consolidating autocratic rule. Those unwilling to live with these political
changes can take advantage of their free movement rights to leave. Since 2010, about 500,000 Hungarians have
left their country to escape various policies of the Orbán government, from the constant surveillance and
harassment of opposition ﬁgures, to the abolition of social beneﬁts for those who are not aﬃliated with the
governing party, to the sudden removal of scholarships from students who do not tow the party line, and more.
By providing an avenue for those under political pressure to leave, the EU allows the rogue states to govern
even more peacefully without resistance. Poland might even learn from Hungary how to adjust the electoral laws
to make it nearly impossible for these opposition members who have left the country to vote in subsequent
elections (see Scheppele, Hungary, An Election in Question, Part 4).
If PiS eventually gains the required majority in a subsequent rigged election to revise the national constitution,
the next step would be to reshape it so as to further entrench their power. This is what happened in Hungary.
With the adoption of the so-called Fourth Amendment to the Hungarian Constitution in Spring 2013, nearly all of
the laws that the pre-captured Constitutional Court had declared unconstitutional under the new Constitution
were inserted directly into the Constitution. In addition, the entire jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court from
1990-2011 was nulliﬁed and the Court was prevented it from reviewing that or other constitutional amendments
for their consistency with the rest of the text. The result was the entrenchment of constitutional capture (see
Scheppele’s Testimony before the US Congress)
By failing to trigger Article 7 TEU at that point, the Commission abdicated its duties. Unsurprisingly, after a brief
chorus of condemning noises, they acted like nothing had happened and not even the recent destruction and
erasure of Hungary’s largest circulation newspaper Népszabadság and the recent murky deal to involve Russia
in the building of nuclear reactors seem have led to any eﬀective reactions. The Commission now treats Hungary
as if it is a normal country. But this is a new normal, to say the least.
The cases of Hungary and Poland, to only mention EU examples, suggests a new worrying pattern in the fate of
constitutional democracies. There is now a recipe for constitutional capture being followed in one state after
another:
1. First people lose faith in the system;
2. Then they vote to break the system by electing populist autocrats who trash the pre-existing constitution
with cleverly crafted legalistic blueprints borrowed from other ‘successful’ autocrats, a pattern that led Prof
Cooley to speak of a new “League of Authoritarian Gentlemen”;
3. To remain popular while doing so, these autocrats engage in beneﬁt giveaways while shutting down the
democratic opposition and all opposition-friendly (or for that matter truth-friendly) news outlets while they
also bully NGOs and any independent-minded civil servants, judges, lawyers academics and military
oﬃcers still remaining;
4. They then change the election law, the electorate (by pushing the opposition out of the country) or both;
5. When people eventually wake up to the damage done, it is too late because their constitutional system
has been captured and no constitutional avenue remains to challenge the government any longer;
6. In the unlikely situation where resistance emerges from the Parliament, biased referenda can always be
organised to conﬁrm the will of the leader under the guise of the will of ‘the people’;
7. Having sealed the space against dissenting voices and rewritten electoral regulations, autocrats can then
expect to get the votes they need to win subsequent elections without much eﬀort. In this way, the rotation
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of power from one party to another becomes a feature of the past.
2.2 Looking beyond Article 7 to Preserve the Rule of Law?
Since EU institutions, and in particular the intergovernmental ones, appear unwilling to resort to Article 7 TEU
even when faced with the most blatant and systemic attacks on the rule of law by authorities that openly mock
them, it may be time for scholars unwilling to let Poland or Hungary slide into illiberalism to declare Article 7 dead
for all intents and purposes. And since the ordinary infringement procedure (as currently interpreted and applied)
and political persuasion (either outside or within the rule of law framework) have also not served as eﬀective
tools to prevent constitutional capture of democratic systems previously based on the rule of law, what legal and
non-legal avenues are left as potential options to deal with the current situation in Poland?
We would urge the Commission to respond to systemic attacks on the rule of law by launching systemic
infringement actions. Even without the other EU institutions, it still has the power to act. In a systemic
infringement action, the Commission would up the ante against rogue Member States by adjusting the normal
infringement action in two ways: 1) By packaging together a set of distinct infringements in a single infringement
action, the Commission would show that it can connect the dots the same way that the autocrats do by
acknowledging that the takeover of multiple independent institutions is part of a common plan to erode checks
and balances; 2) By attaching a more systemic legal theory to this package, the Commission could identify that
systemic infringements call for systemic diagnosis and treatment. The Commission could bring such a packaged
claim either under Article 4(3) TEU by arguing that the Member State is systematically thwarting the realisation
of EU law within its legal system. Or the Commission could package a set of ordinary acquis violations with
violations of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to indicate that these violations rise to a more serious level (in
fact, the Commission has already done this once with regard to Hungary’s asylum policy). Alternatively, the
Commission could charge a violation of Article 2 values directly, under the rubric of the rule of law. After all, if it
could trigger Article 7 to address rule of law violations, why couldn’t it use its ordinary powers to attempt a legal
resolution before moving to the more “nuclear” political strategy of Article 7?
Under any of these legal theories for bringing a systemic infringement action, the Commission – if backed by the
Court of Justice – would give itself more room to insist on systemic compliance with the principles of EU law and
not just the formal letter of the acquis. This systemic approach is crucial to preventing cosmetic patches from
disguising the underlying systemic problems. If the Commission is unwilling to reinterpret the infringement
procedure in this way, we call on Member States, as suggested by Prof Kochenov, to rediscover Article 259
TFEU and test the approach advocated above in the Court of Justice. It may be worth recalling that under this
Treaty provision, one or more Member States can ﬁle an infringement action directly against another Member
State for violating EU law and bring the matter before the Court of Justice. There is no reason why one or more
Member States themselves could not construct these infringement actions to be more systemic as we have
suggested.
If one of these more systemic procedures results in an adverse judgment of the Court of Justice, and the
Commission tries and fails to get the Member State in question to comply, the Commission could return to the
Court under Article 260 TFEU to request a large ﬁne, as beﬁts a large violation, and penalty payments where
relevant. In fact, given the capacious wording of Article 260 TFEU, we see no reason why the Commission
couldn’t deduct the resulting ﬁne from the funding streams allocated to the oﬀending Member State from EU
coﬀers. Nothing in Article 260 requires that the money to pay the ﬁne come from the state treasury to the EU.
Money is fungible, and it would provide an added incentive for the Member State to comply if its regional or
cohesion or other funds were temporarily suspended in the amount of the this ﬁne, pending compliance with a
judgment of the Court of Justice.
In fact, ﬁnancial sanctions may be the most promising way forward considering the political constraints that seem
to paralyse all of the EU institutions. Indeed, Poland and Hungary are two of the largest recipients of EU regional
and cohesion funding and as the recent example of Poland shows, new welfare beneﬁts, which appear
unaﬀordable in the long term, were used to “buy” popularity while the capture of the Polish state is taking place
(see e.g. Foy and Huber, “Polish pension U-turn alarms economics but cheers voters”, Financial Times, 3
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December 2016). While suspending already committed EU funding would itself breach the rule of law absent
reasoned opinions within the footprint of existing EU law, a number of options may be explored. Attaching the
suspension of funds to a judgement under Article 260 TFEU is one. But there are other possibilities. As
suggested by Marek Grela, who was Poland’s ﬁrst permanent representative to the EU (cited by Taylor, “For EU,
Poland is not yet lost”, Politico.eu, 23 Nov. 2016), “the Commission could declare that the absence of
independent judicial scrutiny and the sacking of experts means it can no longer certify that EU funds are being
properly spent”, which “could justify additional safeguards before structural or agricultural funds are disbursed.”
EU money could also be rerouted through infra-national authorities, sidestepping the central government. Direct
or indirect ﬁnancial support for civil society groups should also be examined.
Looking beyond the attacks on the rule of law, EU Member States need to wake up to the fact that the actions of
Hungary’s Orbán and Poland’s Kaczyński provide a model that can easily spread to other EU Member States
taken over by populists with autocratic ambitions. This means that, even apart from a desire to preserve the rule
of law, EU institutions ought to take serious action against Poland and against Hungary so as to further prevent
the EU from being undermined from within by an even larger group of states whose elections have gone
populist. If we allow a minority or a grouping of EU Member States to show complete disregard for values and
key principles underlying the functioning of the EU, there may be no other way forward than reconstituting the EU
without those who have chosen an illiberal path. But as we can see with Brexit and the problems of disentangling
debtor countries from the Euro-zone, breaking up is hard to do. Better to ﬁx the problems while the EU still can.
Hungary might have appeared to EU institutions as a one-oﬀ. But now that Poland is following suit, we can see
that worst practices travel around the EU just as well as – and perhaps even better than – best practices. With
populist parties gaining in many Member States and the Visegrád group seemingly gaining inﬂuence within the
EU, it is time for the EU to realise that this is a threat that must be addressed now. Europe’s other crises may
look more pressing, but none of the other crises reaches as deep into the future of Europe as this one.
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